H/T Marc Bellemare
H/T Marc Bellemare
Fewer people are dying in violent conflict (both in absolute figures and as a proportion of the total population of humans) than at any time since World War II. It is hard to believe this amid the flood of images and stories of violent death (state-sanctioned or otherwise) in countries like Mexico, the United States, Burundi, or Syria.
The World Bank’s Africa Gender Innovation Lab (GIL) is hiring three GIL Fellows from Sub-Saharan Africa. The Lab conducts rigorous impact evaluations of development interventions to generate evidence on how to close gender gaps in productivity, earnings, and assets.
The GIL Fellowship Program aims to develop the skills of prospective PhD students – as well as recent PhD graduates – from Sub-Saharan Africa to prepare them for a PhD or help them jumpstart their post-doctoral research career. We seek two types of candidates: those who wish to do research in a quantitative discipline (e.g., economics) and those who wish to conduct qualitative research. Applicants will be asked to indicate a preference for a quantitative or qualitative fellowship position.
Here are the details:
Who: Women and men (under the age of 36) who are nationals of a Sub-Saharan African country and plan to pursue – or have just completed – a PhD in economics, public policy, statistics, sociology, or a related field
What: One-year fellowship (World Bank term staff position)
Where: Washington DC-based position with travel to Sub-Saharan Africa
When: Apply by 6 January 2016
How: Follow this link to apply on the World Bank’s website: http://goo.gl/7VpkEL
There is strong evidence linking skin complexion to negative stereotypes and adverse real-world outcomes. We extend these findings to political ad campaigns, in which skin complexion can be easily manipulated in ways that are difficult to detect. Devising a method to measure how dark a candidate appears in an image, this paper examines how complexion varied with ad content during the 2008 presidential election campaign (study 1). Findings show that darker images were more frequent in negative ads—especially those linking Obama to crime—which aired more frequently as Election Day approached. We then conduct an experiment to document how these darker images can activate stereotypes, and show that a subtle darkness manipulation is sufficient to activate the most negative stereotypes about Blacks—even when the candidate is a famous counter-stereotypical exemplar—Barack Obama (study 2). Further evidence of an evaluative penalty for darker skin comes from an observational study measuring affective responses to depictions of Obama with varying skin complexion, presented via the Affect Misattribution Procedure in the 2008 American National Election Study (study 3). This study demonstrates that darker images are used in a way that complements ad content, and shows that doing so can negatively affect how individuals evaluate candidates and think about politics.
The paper is titled “Bias in the Flesh: Skin Complexion and Stereotype Consistency in Political Campaigns,” by Messing, Jabon, and Plaut.
The average adult American (regardless of party ID, ideology, race, or region) grew up in an era in which news media and popular portrayal of Americans of African origin (and for that matter, Africans) was far worse than it is today. So findings like these, and their real political and economic consequences, are gonna be with us for a while.
H/T Dina Pomeranz
There’s a veritable reason President John Pombe Magufuli is a Tanzanian, and not a Kenyan. It’s the same reason Chief Justice Willy Mutunga is a product of the University of Dar es Salaam, and not the University of Nairobi. President Magufuli embodies the immutable character forged into the Tanzanian identity by President Julius Kambarage Nyerere, the philosopher-king. It’s a national character of service and selflessness that made Tanzania the anchor of the African liberation movement — the Mecca of all black freedom fighters.
It’s a mchicha [sukumawiki] culture of simplicity that eschews public gluttony, impunity, and vileness. That’s why #WhatWouldMagufuliDo has become a household hashtag. Not since President Nyerere have we seen the likes of Mr Magufuli in Africa. There’s a famous quote, attributed variously to Alexis de Tocqueville or Joseph de Maistre, which speaks of the character of a nation, a people. It says that “In a democracy, people elect the government they deserve.” The keys to the nugget are “democracy” and “elect.” In other words, it speaks of the free expression of the will of the people through an open plebiscite. In Tanzania, the people decided to “elect” Mr Magufuli over the opposition candidate, former PM Edward Lowassa. Even before the election, Mr Magufuli had distinguished himself as the hardest working member of the Kikwete government. Mr Lowassa was wildly popular, but Mr Magufuli beat him hands down. The people spoke.
…… In contrast, faced with a stark choice in Kenya in 2013, my compatriots were said to prefer Jubilee’s Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto over CORD’s Raila Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka. The former faced charges for crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court. I was one among many who placed obstacles in Mr Kenyatta’s election. I argued that electing an ICC indictee wasn’t in the national interest. But voters were polarised along ethnic blocks and failed to see my logic. Today — three years after the election — Kenyans are more depressed than ever, and every new scandal sinks the country into a deeper funk. Most Kenyans today wish Mr Magufuli was a Kenyan. I hate to say I’ve no sympathy.
This is among a long line of Kenya-Tanzania comparisons that often serve to highlight the relative moral/ethical deficiencies of the former. Kenyans are corrupt and boorish; Tanzanians are polite and virtuous. Kenyans are rabid tribalists; Tanzanians have a strong national identity crafted around Kiswahili as a national language and the great Mwalimu Julius Nyerere’s vision for the Muungano (full disclosure, like Mutua, I am also intellectually enamored by the Dar es Salaam School).
Like all sweeping narratives there is some truth to these comparisons. And bucket loads of unsubstantiated hype. For example, under both Mkapa and Kikwete Tanzania had its share of mega corruption scandals, not unlike what happens north of the Kilimanjaro. Kenya ranks 145/175 in Transparency International’s perception of corruption rankings. Tanzania is at 119/175, still experiencing widespread corruption. The same slight differences are depicted in Afrobarometer survey results (See above. Tanzania is on the left. Question asks for respondents’ perceived share of government officials involved in corruption).
Also, the income of the average Kenyan is almost 1.5 times that of her Tanzanian counterpart. The infant mortality rates (per 1,000 live births) are 37 and 51 in Kenya and Tanzania, respectively.
Mwalimu once quipped that Kenya is a dog-eat-dog society. To which Kenya’s then Attorney General Charles Njonjo replied that Tanzania is a man-eat-nothing society.
Tanzania’s economy may yet outpace Kenya’s in the near future on account of the former’s solid foundation of nationhood. But for now I think it is fair to say that Kenya’s faux “African Socialism” beat Tanzania’s Ujamaa in delivering the goods, the morality of it all notwithstanding.
Oh, and what about the tired stereotyping of Kenyans as being more hardworking than Tanzanians? Well, according to Pew survey findings a bigger proportion of Tanzanians (than Kenyans) believe that the best way to get ahead is through hard work.
So there is that.
Recent studies on African economic history have emphasized the structural impediments to African growth, such as adverse geographical conditions and extractive colonial institutions. The evidence is mainly drawn from cross-country regressions on late 20th century income levels, assuming persistent effects of historical causes over time. But to which extent has African poverty been a persistent phenomenon? Our study sheds light on this question by providing new evidence on long-term African growth-trajectories. We show that slave trade regressions are not robust for pre-1970s GDP per capita levels, or for pre-1973 and post-1995 growth rates. We calculate urban unskilled real wages of African workers in nine British African countries 1880-1965, adopting Allen’s (2009) subsistence basket methodology. We find that real wages were above subsistence level, rose significantly over time and were, in major parts of British Africa, considerably higher than real wages in Asian cities up to, at least the 1930s. We explain the intra-African variation in real wage levels by varying colonial institutions concerning land alienation, taxation and immigration.
….slave export intensity is highly and significantly (at the 1% level) correlated to GDP per capita in 2000, but not to income levels in 1950 or 1960. In 1970 the effect is significant at the 10% level, but the coefficient is much smaller than in 2000. Column 4 to 6 shows the regression on growth rates including initial GDP per capita (ln). A regression of slave exports on per capita GDP growth is only statistically significant for the period 1973-1995, which explains why the regression on GDP per capita in 2000 is so robust. However, for the periods 1950- 1973 or 1995-2008 the correlation is insignificant and after 1995 the coefficient turns positive. Hence, the claim that Africa’s slave trades affect current economic performance is multi-interpretable.
That is Northwestern’s Marlous van Waijenberg and Utrecht’s Ewout Frankema in an interesting paper on the issue of structural impediments to economic growth in Africa.
I also found this paragraph interesting:
The welfare ratios of urban unskilled workers in pre-modern London and Amsterdam were obviously higher than in late nineteenth century British Africa. However, the average annual growth rates in Accra between 1880 and 1965 (1.17%) were comparable to the average growth rates in London (1.14%, 1840-1900). Welfare growth rates in some other countries were even higher, although it has to be said that these growth rates were affected by very low starting points. In Mauritius we observed the highest long-term growth rate (1.58%), which suggests that the Mauritian ‘Miracle’ is not just a post-colonial phenomenon.31 In sum, we find little evidence that suggests that four generations of African urban wage workers in the colonial period were trapped into persistent poverty. Welfare improvements were certainly not confined to very specific regions in British Africa or brief periods of time (such as 1945-1960). In fact, the whole idea that Africa has been the poorest and most slowly growing region since the Industrial Revolution is based on a backward extrapolation of post-1960 growth experiences without a historical empirical foundation.
The paper is not about the Nunn thesis per se, but investigates more generally whether historical moments (like the slave trade period) produced structural impediments that have made Africa perennially the slowest growing region of the world (hence the need for explaining the “Africa” dummy in popular research and thought).
I wish development economists read more history, especially economic history.
On Friday, the African Union approved draft plans to send troops to the conflict-ridden Burundi even without permission from Bujumbura in what could be a historic move to stop the country’s impending implosion.
The move by the AU Peace and Security Council reached on Friday despite initial opposition from the Burundi delegation invoked a rarely-used clause in AU Constitutive Act.
Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act provides for sending of troops to a member country under circumstances of war crime, genocide or crimes against humanity without that country’s permission.
More on the African Union’s 5000 strong force for Burundi here. The actual AU resolution establishing the African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU) is available here. Paul D. Williams, an associate professor of international affairs at George Washington University, parses the text of the AU communique here.
This semester I taught a class on intra-Africa IR, mostly looking at economic and security cooperation from 1963 to the present. One of the issues we wrestled with in the class was whether the AU was any different from the OAU, despite the language of Article 4(h). The OAU was notoriously ineffectual in dealing with conflict in Africa, on account of its many non-interference clauses.
Doubts about the AU and its ability to effectively originate an intervention in the face of intra-state conflicts were reinforced by:
(i) its continued commitment to the “equality” of member states (no regional hegemons — like Nigeria, Ethiopia, or South Africa — were given any formal status of first among equals);
(ii) the the deliberate weakening of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) — which has no permanent membership (5 elected for 3 years, 10 for 2 years);
(iv) the fact that the chairmanship of the PSC rotates monthly (by country name alphabetical order), giving any one chair hardly any time to develop the connections required for effective operations of such a sensitive post in a major IO;
(v) the structure of the regional distribution of seats on the PSC which incentivizes a sub-regional logic of seat allocation, as opposed to actual efficiency of the PSC.
It is therefore interesting that 4(h) was today invoked to justify intervention in Burundi, without the direct consent of Bujumbura (Nkurunziza may yet save face by inviting the AU mission under 4(j)).
Also interesting is the fact that the troops will be under the banner of the East African Standby Force (EASF) and not the AU. This will expose the actual operations of the mission to the same EAC politics that I outlined in an earlier post here (for the two of you out there who care to know, the different (sub)regional standby forces actually have formal relationships with the AU, so they are not totally run by the sub-regional RECs but can be seen as a practical first step in the aspirational goal of a continental standby force, someday).
Who said intra-African IR is boring (or does not exist)?
Also, watch out for a draft paper on the politics of intra-Africa IR soon…
A commenter, Dastan Kweka, has an interesting reaction to the post on Burundi (see below).
He contends that: (i) at the time the crisis erupted only Uganda was in a position to take up the role of mediator; (ii) Tanzania’s revealed preference for president of Burundi seems to be Nkurunziza (unless they are sure of an amenable replacement); and (iii) that the EAC is already robustly involved in Burundi and that my characterization of the body is inaccurate (“a pure invention”). Here is his reaction in full:
I have been following and researching the crisis in Burundi for a while now (more than 6 months) especially in relation to the role of the imbonerakure militias. I feel that i am in a position to make informed comments. Therefore, i will point out a few things that the author has either overlooked or chosen to ignore as follows:1. The analysis is not situated within the context under which the crisis was born and which to a larger extent conditioned EAC`s response. When the crisis unfolded in April 25th, Tanzania was preparing for a (political) transition. Kenya was preoccupied with Al Shabab and internal corruption allegations involving senior political figures especially cabinet secretaries. Also, ICC issues especially for the deputy President. Rwanda has always been undesirable when it comes to responding to the situation in Burundi mainly because of the historical animosity. So, the only country that was relatively well positioned to respond at the time was Uganda. And it did respond through EAC. Prior to the appointment of Museveni, EAC consulted with Burundi authorities several times and asked for postponement of elections. As a result, Burundi Presidential elections were rescheduled twice. From June to July 15 then to July 21st. Museveni was appointed to lead the EAC mediation effort in mid July and was endorsed by international parties (ICGLR, AU,UN). It is quite obvious that EAC acted swiftly in a bid to address the then unfolding crisis in Burundi, although the mediation efforts, at the time, failed.
The situation changed in October when election fever engulfed Uganda, which is scheduled to hold Presidential elections in February 2016. When Amama Mbabazi and Kizza Besigye won nominations to run for President of Uganda in the upcoming election, Museveni knew things weren`t going to be business as usual. He therefore sought to commit more time to campaigning and thus delegated mediation efforts to his Minister of Defence, one Kiyonga. Until this stage, mediation efforts were going well. Looking back, we can now agree that delegating was a strategic mistake, but it was necessitated by the context. Mr Kiyonga has failed to even obtain a single inclusive meeting of the conflicting parties. By the way, to what extent is a mediation effort led by a defense minister high-level?
Mr Opalo has argued that “EAC has avoided any kind of direct intervention in Burundi to end what is a singularly political crisis ….“. Isn`t the effort above an example of direct (political) intervention? What kind of intervention is he talking about or would he want to see? In his analysis, he tends to move (covertly) from political intervention to military intervention, without any clarity.
Current information shows that EAC has upgraded the readiness of its standby force and is carrying out necessary preparations in case a need for deployment arises. EAC/AU have military and human rights observers on the ground in Burundi and are working in collaboration with UN in putting together an immediate inclusive dialogue. There is no evidence that they (EAC members) are seeing any difficult in (military) intervention. Isn`t the intervention argument as advanced by the analyst, a pure invention?
2. Intra-regional politics. On this aspect, i somehow agree with Mr Opalo that the region does not have a consensus on the outcomes of the mediation effort. Kagame would want Nkurunzinza to go. Tanzania, i think, wants him to stay until the country can be sure about the stance of a person that will replace him (that is being able to influence his replacement). Uganda and Kenya may be neutral for not having serious interests in Burundi.
Why do i think Tanzania wants him to stay? When the crisis was about to unfold in Burundi in March, 2015, Tanzania made its position clear that the constitution and terms of the Arusha agreement had to be respected. But when Nkurunzinza decided to go ahead with the election, the country, i believe, reneged on its position and sent election observers. Many other countries and international bodies did not. I believe this move signaled a change of position. But, i think, Tanzania remains in full support of the resolution of the conflict through inclusive dialogues.
In my opinion, i think, EAC/AU – through Uganda, was responding well and had the situation under control until, at least, September. In October, Museveni`s attention shifted and mediation efforts faltered. Intra-regional politics are playing a role in slowing down the mediation effort especially as some regional forces strive to boost the position of the sides they are backing so as to, considerably, tilt the political settlement in their favor during negotiations.
Whether or not the EAC has responded “well” to the Burundian crisis, as Mr. Kweka suggests, should be judged by the outcomes. There were meetings and preparations and the appointment of a mediator, yet the body count continues to increase. The EAC should have done more.
One of the reasons for having an international organization like the EAC is so that it can address issues that individual countries may be incentivized to ignore due to domestic political considerations.
Also, it looks like the African Union has approved a possible peacekeeping mission to Burundi (subject to the invitation of the government of Burundi). This is probably a way out of the problems of intra-EAC politics that I highlighted in the earlier post. Unless, of course, Burundi decides to stall the peacekeeping mission by forum shopping between Addis and Arusha.
There are strong signs of ethnic violence. More than 300 people have been killed since President Pierre Nkurunziza successfully violated term limits to stay in office for a third term early this year. The ensuing violence has forced over 220,000 to flee the country, while scores remain displaced internally. Over the last week alone more than 80 people have been murdered in what is increasingly looking like a civil war rather than mere civil unrest met with heavy-handed repression. The African union has used the word “genocide” in reference to the Burundian situation.
So given the clear evidence that things are falling apart in Burundi, why isn’t the East African Community (EAC) doing more to de-escalate the situation?
The simple answer is intra-EAC politics (which serve to accentuate the body’s resource constraints).
The EAC is a five-member (Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda) regional economic community (REC) that is arguably the most differentiated REC in Africa. Based in Arusha, Tanzania, it is a relatively robust institution replete with executive, legislative and judicial arms.
Like is the case for most African RECs, the EAC member states conceded precious little sovereignty to Arusha. For example, the EAC treaty does not directly empower the REC to intervene in a member country even in cases of gross violations of human rights (like is currently happening in Burundi). So far regional cooperation within the EAC has mainly focused on economic issues that do not pose substantial threats to sovereignty. It is for this reason that the EAC has avoided any kind of direct intervention in Burundi to end what is a singularly political crisis — both within Burundi and at the regional level.
That said, Article 123 of the EAC treaty provides a loophole for intervention.
The Article stipulates that the purpose of political cooperation among EAC member states is to, among other things: (i) strengthen the security of the Community and its Partner States in all ways; and (ii) preserve peace and strengthen international security among the Partner States and within the Community. In my view these clauses mandate the EAC to protect both the internal security of Burundi as well as intra-EAC security.
It is important to note that so far the norm has been to treat vagueness in African REC treaties as a call to inaction. But vagueness also provides willing interveners with a fair amount of latitude over interpretation. Furthermore, since 2000 the trend within African RECs has been to dilute the infamous OAU non-intervention clauses (see the AU treaty, for example) especially with regard to security matters.
It is not hard to see how the conflict in Burundi poses a clear and present danger to both Burundi’s internal security as well as peace and security within the EAC.
We know from history that an all out civil war in Burundi would threaten the security of the region. Burundi’s ethnic make up roughly mirrors that of Rwanda. Ethnic conflict in Burundi would inevitably elicit an intervention from Rwanda, thereby regionalizing the conflict (with an almost guaranteed knock on effect in eastern DRC). In addition, even though Kagame may not be a fan of Nkurunziza, he lacks the moral authority to criticize him given recent moves to scrap term limits in Rwanda.
If Rwanda (overtly) intervenes in Burundi, it is not clear which side Tanzania — a critical player — would take (especially because of the implications for the stability of eastern DRC). Kigali and Dodoma do not always see eye to eye. In addition, the new Tanzanian president, John Magufuli, is not particularly close to his Kenyan counterpart on account of his closeness to Kenyan opposition leader Raila Odinga. This may limit the possibility of collective action on Burundi by the EAC’s two leading powers.
And then there is Uganda. President Yoweri Museveni is currently the designated mediator in the Burundian negotiation process. But he is currently preoccupied in his bid to win an nth term in office (who’s counting?) His legitimacy as a mediator is seriously in question on account of his political record back home. Recall that the proximate cause of the current crisis in Burundi was Nkurunziza’s decision to violate term limits. Museveni scrapped term limits in 2005 and has systematically squeezed the Ugandan opposition into submission through heavy handed tactics that are direct violations of human rights.
Sadly for Burundians, the current state of inter-state relations within the EAC is strongly biased against any robust intervention to stop the violence that is increasingly becoming routine. Nkurunziza knows this, and will likely try to make an end run on his perceived political opponents before the wider international community begins to pay closer attention.
Lastly, the other possible interveners — the UN and the EU — are also not likely to intervene in Burundi any time soon, despite the country’s heavy dependence on foreign aid. Europe is hobbled by the ongoing refugee crisis and the war on ISIS. As for the UN, it increasingly launders its interventions through region or sub-regional IOs (see for example AMISOM in Somalia, under the AU). This kind of strategy requires a willing regional partner, something that is lacking in the case of the EAC (or the AU for that matter).
In the next few weeks there will probably be attempts at mediation and calls for a ceasefire. But my hunch is that things are likely to get much worse in Burundi in the short term.
A lot has been written about Jacob Zuma’s failures as president of South Africa, most recently his odd decision to fire his widely respected finance minister, Nhanhla Nene. Zuma replaced Nene with an unknown ANC MP, David van Rooyen, only to replace van Rooyen with former finance minister Pravin Gordhan after intense pressure from the media and the markets.
Sources indicate that Mr. Nene was fired for holding the line on fiscal discipline.
Much of the analysis so far has focused on President Jacob Zuma — his increasing personalization of power within the ANC, corruption, and even his private life.
Both Mbeki and Zuma are ANC cadres through and through and it’s the party policy that determines what they do. Zuma has not strayed from the ANC policies and no one has yet made this claim in any meaningful way. So, if it’s not policy that is the problem, how do we judge Zuma’s performance?
The main problem is that his detractors fundamentally agree with the ANC policies and they have therefore chosen to find fault with Zuma the man and thereby rob us of a useful analysis of why things are falling apart. A shift from Zuma to policy would also show that his presidency is a product of policy; the template for things to fall apart was designed by his predecessors.
Zuma’s sin, which has been missed by the analysts, who are too driven by “Zumaphobia”, is that he has not been able or willing to halt the downward spiral, which is essentially a byproduct of ANC policies. The main policy plank of the ANC since it took over in 1994 has been correctly described as neoliberalism – the privileging of capitalism as the driver of society.
The implications of this policy direction are to increasingly remove the state from society and the economy and allow the profit motive to determine who gets what service. The state privatises assets and those it keeps are similarly managed as if they are capitalist entities.
The piece at times sounds anti-market. But don’t let that distract you from its succinct understanding of the political economy challenges facing South Africa.
In 2008 the ANC recalled then President Thabo Mbeki. There is no reason to believe that President Jacob Zuma has totally eclipsed the party machinery. Indeed this has been made clear by his quick retreat after the brazen attempt to weaken the finance ministry.
Recent events in South Africa suggest that the party of Mandela is no longer(if it ever was) the voice of the people. But this outcome cannot be pinned on Zuma. The party elite, including Zuma, largely remain hostage to the post-apartheid political settlement. Meanwhile, the country’s deplorable economic indicators are adding fuel to the fire that is the Economic Freedom Fighters (which is increasingly sounding more and more mainstream and in tune with the frustrations not just of South Africans, but younger Africans in general north of the Limpopo). On a recent tour of London the EFF leader, Julius Malema, held meetings with CEOs of companies with interests in South Africa — a signal that these companies appreciate the potency of his message of economic freedom.
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