More comments on the African Academy (by Grieve Chelwa)

This is a guest post by Grieve Chelwa, UCT Economics PhD and current Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for African Studies at Harvard University.

Here’s Ken Opalo’s reaction to Alex de Waal’s piece on the African academy. Recall that de Waal’s piece was critical of the absence of African scholars in producing scholarship on Africa.

As I read Ken’s piece, these 3 things immediately struck me:

1. Ken says: “As a social scientist, my knowledge of Kenya is largely informed by my experience as a Nairobian. Over the years I have had to learn a lot about the rest of Kenya, in much the same way an Australian would. In doing so I incurred a lower cost than a hypothetical Australian would, for sure, but the cost was not zero. The point here is that it is not necessarily true that I have an innate ability to *know* Kenyan politics better than an Australian ever would if they invested the time and effort.”

Really, Ken? As an undergrad at the University of Zambia, I was always struck by the intimate knowledge my lecturers had of the country. The kind of knowledge outsiders could only pretend to have. Ken acknowledges that the costs of learning about Kenya differ between Kenyans and non-Kenyans – and this is precisely the point de Waal is making. Because outsiders face a higher cost, and combined with their academic privilege as gatekeepers of leading journals, the scholarship on Africa is consequently poorer than it should.

The longer Ken and I live away from “home” as we currently do, the more we become like this hypothetical Australian. I think de Waal isn’t speaking about us Ken. He’s speaking about that lady and gentleman who’ve spent a lifetime lecturing at the University of Nairobi, at the University of Zambia, at Ibadan, etc so that their costs of knowing and writing about their respective countries are now almost zero. Paradoxically, the voices of these fountains of wisdom are nowhere to be seen in the “leading” journals.

2. Ken then says: “And who is to say that I would necessarily be able to articulate a research agenda on whatever subject in Malawi better than a Southern Californian? What proportion of Kenyans can locate Bangui on a map?”

In my experience, African-based scholars, unlike their boisterous counterparts in the West, rarely pretend to be experts beyond their country of nationality. A lecturer at the University of Zambia spends most of their time thinking and writing about Zambian problems. On the other hand, it’s not unusual to see a Western scholar jumping from country to country in Africa pontificating on this or that. These are the types who describe themselves as “African Experts” on their curriculum vitaes. And by the way Ken, the typical Kenyan needn’t know where Bangui is (although I don’t doubt that they do). But the typical Kenyan academic certainly knows where Bangui is.

3. Lastly Ken says: “The problem is not that Western academics are asking the wrong questions, or that certain methodological approaches are privileged over others. The real problem is that there is a limited pool of high quality Africa-based scholars.”

Where is the evidence Ken for this often-heard (especially in the West) accusation that African scholars are low calibre? Without providing any evidence, all that you’re doing is discrediting the many teachers who’ve taught generations of African undergraduates at African universities over the years – some of these undergraduates have gone on to collect advanced degrees at some of the leading universities in the world.

The bigger problem here (and I think Godwin Murunga made this point on a thread on Nic Cheeseman‘s wall) is that African academics have given up on playing the academic arms race that’s infected the Western academy. In the same way Ken’s hypothetical Australian faces higher costs in learning about Kenya, African academics also face prohibitively higher costs in trying to publish in Western journals (they are not in the networks, desk rejected on the basis of institutional affiliation, clientelism, etc…). It’s tiring and they just don’t want to bother playing that tiring game.

Two quick reactions:

[i].   There is a lot of bad quant research on Africa out there done by fly-by-night “Africa experts” (I am talking lots and lots of silly experiments and cross-country regressions). But there is also a lot of great work that is bringing hard data (both micro and macro) to bear in answering important questions in a variety of fields. To the extent that we all acknowledge that making African states legible, through data, improves the quality of governance, then we should encourage more aspiring African scholars to acquire the tools needed to study their respective states and societies. And as a comparativist, I think that there is value in cross-country comparisons. A Zambian scholar who has studied Kenya probably gets Zambia better than one who ONLY studies Zambia. I don’t think it is wise for African academics of give up on the “tech arms race.” A diversity of skills and methodologies is good for overall knowledge production. I firmly believe that the credibility revolution in social science has left us all unambiguously better off.

[ii].  I also don’t think that pointing out the dearth of high quality research in African universities is a controversial claim. We can quibble over the politics of university rankings, the privileging of specific forms of “evidence”, et cetera, but the fact is that Africa, as a region, has very few top notch universities. This is not to say that there aren’t any centres of excellence in Nairobi, Lusaka, Cape Town, or Ibadan. My own experience tells me that a variety of factors — poor pay, insane teaching loads, consultancies, etc — make it very difficult for Africa-based academics to do research (or for that matter, to teach well). Only focusing on demand side issues without addressing the supply side ignores the basic challenge of how to improve the conduct of research in African universities. My point here is that even if we fixed the biases at leading journals Africa-based scholars would still be handicapped relative to their counterparts based in the West. These specific supply side issues matter.

Of course, underlying all this discussion is a politics of knowledge production. We live in an uncomfortable world in which scholarship on Africa by Africans is hard to come by in Western universities; and Western “experts” tend to have privileged access to policymakers on the Continent relative to Africa-based researchers. My contention is that solving this problem requires both demand and supply side solutions. Of course we should encourage Western academics to read, cite, and teach more works by Africans. And of course African governments should take their own scholars more seriously. But only focusing on the demand side problems ignores serious supply side constraints that are faced by Africa-based scholars.

 

First year of graduate school, anyone?

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H/T Morgan Hoke.

Alex de Waal on the African Academy

In a recent article Tufts’ Alex de Waal makes an important point on the nature of policy research in Africa:

……. Analysis is shaped to suit the audience, and scholars end up speaking their language. Rather than evidence-based policy, there is policy-based evidence-making [emphasis mine]. The paradigm of this is engaging with western governments, the World Bank or the United Nations. Much of the policy-related discourse on good governance, post-conflict reconstruction and development takes place in a fantasy land that exists only in the minds of international civil servants.

A little bit harsh, but not completely off the mark. As I’ve written before, we need to make a distinction between research that is meant to inform policy in specific contexts, and that which is designed to generate general knowledge (and perhaps most importantly, for reviewers). What is good for reviewers is seldom useful for policymakers.

That said, I don’t think the burden to produce policy-relevant research (for African states) should be on scholars based in the West.

Africa-based scholars are the best placed to produce policy-relevant research in their own countries. They are the ones who are best able to grapple with the policy judgement calls that often require one to take political positions. Foreign researchers have to worry about research permits (for themselves or their sponsor donor agencies) and therefore have strong incentives to recommend “politically neutral” and “technical” (read apolitical) policy solutions. Of course not every researcher conforms to the type suggested here. But there is no denying that foreign scholars face slightly different incentives than their domestic counterparts.

Where there might be some mileage on this front is with the “public sector” research arms of the World Bank and the African Development Bank.

On African academics, de Waal has this to say:

…… the structure of academic rewards and careers systematically disadvantages those who do not have the skills or capacities for this kind of high-end quantitative endeavour or have serious misgivings about it. This causes severe dissonance between actual lived experience and the academic work that is validated by universities.

… Supervisors in foreign universities rarely have the subject matter expertise, so they tend to guide students towards more theoretical approaches. Examiners and peer reviewers likewise reward and reinforce their own disciplinary biases. On the other hand, it is common to see junior Western scholars doing rather uninteresting quantitative studies or superficial case studies. Despite their shortcomings these studies are published. These scholars, then, become the group that undertakes peer review.

The African scholar of political science may be compelled to adopt a schizoid personality. To become an academic in a Western university she or he may be obliged to unlearn important knowledge, and learn frameworks and skills that are actually irrelevant to the situation at hand but are necessary for being considered a professional academic.

Here I think de Waal moves dangerously close to endorsing “African Exceptionalism.” It is almost as if the African grad student shows up in grad school imbued with unique knowledge of the Continent that is inaccessible to their potential advisers and colleagues. Also, I don’t think the study of Africa should be pigeonholed as existing outside basic rules of evidence-based policymaking and properly identified causal stories. Despite the enduring allure of the idea, Africa is not exceptional.

As a social scientist, my knowledge of Kenya is largely informed by my experience as a Nairobian. Over the years I have had to learn a lot about the rest of Kenya, in much the same way an Australian would. In doing so I incurred a lower cost than a hypothetical Australian would, for sure, but the cost was not zero. The point here is that it is not necessarily true that I have an innate ability to *know* Kenyan politics better than an Australian ever would if they invested the time and effort.

And who is to say that I would necessarily be able to articulate a research agenda on whatever subject in Malawi better than a Southern Californian? What proportion of Kenyans can locate Bangui on a map?

In my view, much of the handwringing about the methodologies employed in the study of the Continent misses the point. The problem is not that Western academics are asking the wrong questions, or that certain methodological approaches are privileged over others. The real problem is that there is a limited pool of high quality Africa-based scholars. Increasing the pool of talented Africa-based researchers would boost the variety of perspectives and methodologies employed in the study of the region — to the benefit of all involved. This can be achieved by providing better funding opportunities for African universities and incentivizing high quality research by Africa-based faculty.

Several African public figures (and associates) mentioned in the Panama Papers

The Guardian has an excellent summary of what you need to know about the Panama Papers, the data leak of the century from the Panama-based law firm Mossack Fonseca.The firms specializes, among other things, in incorporating companies in offshore jurisdictions that guarantee secrecy of ownership.

Here is a map of the companies and clients mentioned in the leaked documents (source). Apparently, the entire haul (2.6 terabytes of data) has information on 214,000 shell companies spanning the period between 1970 to 2016.

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The leaked documents show links to 72 current or former heads of state and government. So far the highest-ranking public official most likely to resign as a result  of the leak is the Prime Minister of Iceland, Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson (see story here and here)

For a list of African public officials mentioned in the leaked documents see here. And I am sure we are going to hear a lot about all these rich people in developing countries.Screen Shot 2016-04-03 at 9.18.42 PM

Closer to home, the Daily Nation reports that Kenya’s Deputy Chief Justice, Kalpana Rawal, “has been linked to a string of shell companies registered in a notorious Caribbean tax haven popular with tax dodgers, dictators and drug dealers.” Justice Rawal has been dodging retirement for a while. May be after the latest revelations might find a reason to call it quits.

The ICIJ website has neat figures summarizing some of the findings from the massive data haul. Also, here is a Bloomberg story on the tax haven that is the United States. 

An airport within earshot of drums

Author Steve Almond deconstructs “Africa” by Toto.

Enjoy:

President Uhuru Kenyatta’s State of the National Address to Parliament

On Thursday President Uhuru Kenyatta presented his annual report to the joint session of Parliament. You can find the text of the speech here and the youtube clip here.

Key achievements of his administration over the last three years include (i) rural electrification (nearly all primary schools have been connected to the grid — THIS IS PRETTY BIG DEAL); (ii) the construction of a new railway line (the project is a corruption boondoggle, but the speed with which it is being carried out is stunning); and (iii) power generation.

Below is a word cloud showing some of the issues the president focused on. Corruption, health (hospital), security, and general service provision were the main policy areas that the president chose to focus on.

I was surprised by the failure of “agriculture”, “land”, “education”, and “infrastructure” to make the top twenty. “Road” had a respectable show. There was also a lot of politics — mainly directed at the opposition and civil society.

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Perhaps in reaction to David Ndii’s provocative article on the failure of the Kenya Project, the president’s speech was particularly nationalist. The words “Covenant” and “Nationalist” appeared 27 and 22 times, respectively, well ahead of key policy-related terms.

I am personally worried that the word “development” outperformed “economic/economy.” I hope this is not a signal that the government views the running of the economy as a massive “development project.” We all know how those usually turn out.