There was a time when Somalia was different…
Democracy is also a deeply rooted Somali political principle which, I suspect, continues much as usual in the more remote parts of the nomadic interior. How long it will be before it reasserts itself in the central political life of the state remains to be seen.
We are still waiting.
For an account of the politics of the Siad Barre coup of 1969 check out Lewis (1972)
The ICG has an excellent new report on the state of the the Kenyan military intervention in Somalia.
The pressing issues raised in the report include economic, political and social concerns:
The slow pace of the military operation and the high cost of keeping troops in the field are the main reasons behind Nairobi’s desire to operate under AMISOM command. The treasury would then not have to pay the full cost of the campaign. It is estimated that Linda Nchi is costing the government at least KSh 210 million ($2.8 million) per month in personnel costs alone in a year of a record KSh 236 billion ($3.1 billion) budget deficit. If the interven- tion’s cost is not contained, already high inflation will spiral, and local discontent could become more serious…..
The intervention in Somalia is likely to have a complex impact on Kenyan Somalis’ political positions, because their attitude toward it is not straightforward. The government’s desire to establish a buffer zone between the border and the rest of Somalia privileges the Ogaden, the majority Kenyan-Somali clan. The possibility of a semi-autonomous state in the south of Somalia politically dominated by Ogaden may not be favoured by the minority, marginalised clans of north-eastern Kenya, such as the Ajuran and Degodia…..
Views within the ethnic Somali and wider Muslim community regarding the war are mixed but predominantly critical. Even those now mildly supportive could easily become hostile, especially if things go badly wrong, and civilian deaths mount. The notion that the war is popular within the Muslim community is wishful thinking, and the potential to exacerbate already worrying radicalisation in the country is very real. The police and other security services have shown some restraint in bigger cities, but there have been numerous reports of abuses in North Eastern Province.
Who was the first leader of independent Africa who lost an election and agreed to step down?
No, it was not Mathieu Kerekou of Benin.
Because my adviser [I doubt he reads this blog] spent some of his early years in academia working and publishing on Somalia, I have been reminded quite a few times that back in 1967 Somalia’s president Aden Abdulle Osman Daar was actually the first leader of independent Africa to lose an election and agree to step down [see here].
This is a fact that many Africanists and journalists have forgotten. Please give credit where it is due.
The East African reports:
There are four major factors that have bogged down the military campaign. They are: Lack of finances to run a long-drawn war; the differences between interested parties over whether to divide Somalia into autonomous regions or maintain one united country; differences over the option to engage Al Shabaab in a political dialogue, and the ambivalence of Somalia’s President Sheikh Shariff Ahmed.
Kenya’s intention has always been to create an autonomous region in southern Somalia to act as a buffer to the chaotic mix that is central Somalia. The plan has apparently become even more ambitious:
Kenya is proposing the division of Somalia into eight autonomous regions: Central region or Hiran; Somaliland; Puntland; Bay Bakool; Jubaland; Shabelle; Gedo and Mogadishu, commonly known as Banadir.
But it is increasingly becoming apparent that the cost and politics of such an operation may not be as palatable as the planners had initially thought.
President Sheikh Shaiff’s ambivalence is intended for the domestic audience and also motivated by his desire to concentrate power in Mogadishu (he dislikes the idea of autonomous regions proposed by Kenya).
The first source of ambivalence is reasonable. No president wants to be in support of a foreign invasion that occasionally results in the death of innocent citizens. I hope the Kenyan commanders, under AMISOM or not, do not pay too much attention to his flip flopping on how to engage the al-Shabab.
The second is not. Two decades of warfare have made it clear that trying to solve Somalia’s problems from Mogadishu may not be a good idea. The only way that might happen is through a force like the Islamic Courts Union. But the international community will not allow a pure military solution, given the human rights implications.
Perhaps it is time a decentralized peace initiative got underway.
Finally, it is encouraging that after weeks of pro-war jingoism the news media in Nairobi have begun to question the execution of the war in Somalia. More public discussion about the logic and cost of the war needs to take place in order to keep both the generals and politicians on the straight and narrow.
On a less serious note: Here is to Somalia, a libertarian’s paradise!
Kenya’s invasion of al-Shabab held parts of Somalia has inadvertently elevated the demand for donkeys. Because of the rains (making the use of vehicles a nightmare) and a desire to disguise their transportation of arms, the al-Shabab have resorted to the use of donkeys.
The BBC reports:
In his latest series of tweets, the Kenyan military spokesman said that the price of donkeys had risen from $150 (£100) to $200 following the increased al-Shabab demand for the animals.
“Any large concentration and movement of loaded donkeys will be considered as al-Shabab activity,” he wrote, suggesting they would be targeted by Kenyan firepower.
“Selling Donkeys to al-Shabab will undermine our efforts in Somalia,” he continued.
Somalis’ improvisation in warfare is well known. The technical (which has been ubiquitous in Libya in recent months) is their key contribution to military technology, and has been the go to battle wagon in many civil wars since the early 1990s.
More on donkey markets here.
Jesus! Good intentions are not enough. (Properly regulated) Markets rule.
Kenya and Eritrea appear to be on a collision course. The Horn might get a little bit hotter in the next few months.
Some insights into politics and development in Nigeria. I hold the minority opinion that Nigeria might yet surprise those short selling it at the moment. The political situation is almost good enough. Remember, all you need (at least for the initial stages of growth) is predictability, not Sweden’s institutions.
AFRICOM has a blog. The posts are sporadic but it’s worth checking out once in a while.
QUICK UPDATE:
Two separate minor explosions rocked Nairobi in the last 24 hours, one at a club on Mfangano Street and another at OTC. One person has been confirmed dead and several people were injured. By targeting ordinary Kenyans in the eastern reaches of the city (instead of other soft targets in upper class parts of town) al-Shabab’s strategy seems to be one of forcing the Kenyan public to pressure the government to stop the military operation in Somalia.
My hunch is that they are mistaken. The Kenyan military did not go into Somalia because of public pressure but because of a desire to restore confidence in the tourism sector and possibly after a little prodding from the US and France. And killing innocent Kenyans will only harden public resolve to have the al-Shabab kicked out of Eastleigh.
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Somali President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed says Kenya’s campaign against Al-Shabaab rebels should not go beyond training Somali soldiers and provision of logistical support in specified and agreed areas.
Speaking while on a visit to the the frontline of the war between his government’s forces and the Al-Shabaab, President Sharif stated that many Somalis were anxious to know more about the military operations reportedly being carried out inside Somalia by Kenyan troops.
Several factors can explain why a beleaguered president, unable to leave a restricted section in his capital, would oppose help that could help stabilize his country.
Whatever the case one hopes that Somalis in the south of the country will not, in their president’s utterances, find justification to actively undermine the Kenyan mission to deny al-Shabab of an operating base.
Meanwhile two grenade explosions have hit Nairobi in the last 24 hours, with one person confirmed dead.
Also, after a week of rallying around the flag in support of Operation Linda Nchi, the Kenyan media is beginning to ask questions about planning and long-term efficacy of the Somalia mission. It is unclear just how much uncertainty, about their own physical security, Kenyans will tolerate as the government continues to execute the war against Al-Shabab.
UPDATE II: John Campbell over at the Council on Foreign Relations discusses the extent of US and French assistance to the Kenyan invasion of al-Shabab controlled regions of Somalia. Check it out here.
UPDATE: Reaction to the Expert Comment from Middleton at Chatham House:
Middleton makes good points about the Kenyan invasion of al-Shabab-held regions of Somalia. The Ethiopian failure in 2006 and potential for a humanitarian crisis must certainly be part of the cost-benefit analysis on the Kenyan side. Failure to establish a secure buffer zone in Southern/Western Somalia and/or to defeat the al-Shabab will definitely have serious consequences.
But the alternative is worse. Al-Shabab elements kidnapped aid workers in Dadaab, in a clear signal that they are willing to disrupt humanitarian aid not only within the areas they control but also within Kenyan. In addition, it is important to appreciate the gravity of the al-Shabab threat to Kenyan security. If al-Shabab is allowed to continue operating within Kenya it may morph into a more dangerous domestic insurgency with a ready supply of disaffected groups – Kenyans in the North East who for decades have been neglected by Nairobi and have legitimate reasons to express those grievances by organizing around such a movement.
In addition, unlike Ethiopia in 2006, Kenya is in Somalia purely for national security purposes. Ethiopia had the baggage of the Ogaden War and the Somali-backed insurgency in its own Ogaden region. Plus it was very clear at the time that the US was bankrolling the Ethiopian war effort – the ICU obviously used this to develop a narrative of western-backed “Christian Ethiopia” invading a Muslim country. Al-Shabab, at least for the moment, does not have the advantage of defining the Kenyan military operation in their own terms
[It is interesting that neither the Kenyan parliament nor presidency has officially declared war on anyone. It is the internal security and defense ministries that have been running the show].
Al-Shabab has been severely weakened around Mogadishu. The ongoing famine has also served to weaken their control of Somalis’ hearts and minds. Their remaining stronghold is the port town of Kismayu whose capture will deprive them of an important supply route and source of revenue (via Indian ocean piracy). If there was ever a good time to try and defeat the group in the battlefield (especially since they have refused to negotiate with anyone), this is it.
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On Sunday the Kenyan armed forces moved into Western/Southern Somalia. The invasion was occasioned by recent kidnappings of tourists and aid workers near the border with Somalia. Al-Shabab, the proscribed terror group in Somalia, is suspected to have been behind the kidnappings, although it denies the charge.
The invasion is a clear signal of the failure of Kenya’s previous policy of strategic containment of the “Somalia problem.”
Source: Gado, Daily Nation
As of Tuesday the Kenyan army had advanced more than 100 miles into Somali territory, although bad weather has significantly slowed the advance. The target town is Al-Shabab’s stronghold port town of Kismayo. The DoD spokesperson Emmanuel Chirchir is reported to have said that “The troops are ready for anything. If it takes us to December they are willing to celebrate Christmas there.”
The invasion comes at a difficult time for the country and will no doubt generate significant economic and political consequences.
Inflation is at over 17%. The Kenyan Shilling is struggling against the US dollar. And the rate of economic growth appears to have slowed from a projected annualized rate of 5.6%. The increase in military expenditure amid high inflation, a severely weakened Shilling and calls for fiscal austerity will surely have a negative impact on future growth prospects. For more on this check out the Business Daily.
On the political side, success in routing al-Shabab will be another feather in retiring President Kibaki’s hat.
Failure might ignite a backlash against the country’s military establishment. It will be interesting to see how the political class deals with failure, since this is the first time that Kenya has ever undertaken a military operation of this scale. My take is that the military, as an institution, will take the fall in case of failure. Because of their ethnicized nature, previous lapses in security in the borders with Ethiopia and Uganda did not create that many problems for the pols in Nairobi. That said, this time might be different because of the nature and scale of the threat.
Of interest will also be how this military operation affects civilian control of the military.
Experience in many less institutionalized countries shows that heightened militarization results in diminished civilian control of the military – with the potential for coups.
I doubt this will be the case in Kenya. However long “Operation Linda Nchi” takes the result will be closer to the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda in the late seventies than to cases where military adventurism resulted in the overthrow of an incumbent (like in Siad Barre’s Somalia). Civilian control of the military in Kenya remains stronger than in most African countries.
Beyond matters of civilian control of the military it is important to consider what the repercussions will be for ordinary Kenyans. Many fear that the al-Shabab might strike Kenya where it hurts most – in Nairobi. This is a real possibility that one hopes the Kenyan government has planned for.
Also, in the event of a protracted war or a major terrorist attack by al-Shabab within Kenya there is the possibility of a backlash against Kenyans of Somali extraction. While this might happen among the masses I doubt that any of the major political figures will actively promote such a misguided reaction. North Eastern Kenya is an important voting bloc that the presidential front-runners in next year’s general election will want on their side (Mr. Odinga, the Kenyan Prime Minister is particular keen on this voting bloc). In this regard the fact that blatant scapegoating of Somalis will have negative political consequences is a source of mild comfort.
The editorial pages of the major newspapers in Kenya have all been solidly behind the invasion. Quoting the Business Daily:
Kenya’s foreign policy has at best been mild and at worst meek.
The nation has been out of the regional combats even when incursions took place in its territory, opting for peaceful resolutions.
This has happened in the Kenya-Ethiopia border during the Oromo wars and during the Ogaden War when Kenya opted for peace parleys rather than battlefield tussles.
But this dud non-aligned policy of the 1960s, exacerbated by the extinguished Cold War, holds no place in the current political order where terrorism and banditry has replaced conventional wars.
There were few options left for Kenya. One, they cannot let the al-Shabaab militia group continue to with their raids oblivious of our military power. Secondly, the sovereignty of our nation, and our pride was undergoing severe test.
The al-Shabab extremism must come to an end.
Something for the humanitarian and aid communites to think about, courtesy of Hand Relief International.
Among those in the know, another fact has not remained unnoticed: there is more money flowing in than used to and that, reader, is excellent news.
The shit continues to be real in Nairobi, the dignified hub of any meaningful Somalia project, with necessary field trips to Dadaab, where HRI has quickly set up cutting-edge infrastructure to ferry high-flyers through, complete with up-to-the minute roster of the photogenic fresh arrivals that can be summoned in an instant with their families for that perfect picture, should the visitor require one for the cover of their all-important trip report or their obligatory article in newspaper of choice back home.
HT Blattman
